

Appendix for “Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War”

This supplementary appendix presents additional empirical results and the survey instrument, which due to space constraints are omitted from the main text of the paper.

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A Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: **Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Sample**

Sociodemographic Variables		Study 1 $N = 4,008$	Study 2 $N = 3,193$	China Internet Census (April 2020)
Gender	Female	48.6%	47.3%	47.3%
	Male	51.0%	51.1%	52.7%
Region	East	26.3%	26.2%	31.1%
	South & Central	37.3%	30.7%	28.2%
	North & Northeast	22.9%	27.2%	22.2%
	West	13.1%	14.2%	18.5%
Age	≤ 29	43.9%	38.5%	48.4%
	30-39	32.1%	40.9%	23.5%
	≥ 40	22.0%	18.9%	28.1%
Education	\leq Junior high	5.2%	1.06%	56.1%
	Senior high	25.4%	16.1%	23.8%
	3-year college	32.2%	43.8%	10.5%
	\geq 4-year college	36.9%	37.5%	9.7%

Note: Data about Chinese Internet users are from *The 45th Statistical Report of Internet Development in China*, issued by China Internet Network Information Center in April 2020.

Table A2: **Balance Checks (Study 1)**

	Control Group	Invasion	Economic Measures	Military Measures	Lack Military Measures	F -test p-value
Age Group	2.72	2.81	2.78	2.73	2.75	0.49
Female	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.61
Education	3.03	3.05	2.98	3.02	2.98	0.56
Party Member	0.16	0.17	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.31
Pol Interests	3.61	3.58	3.50	3.52	3.61	0.21
Ideology	3.81	3.81	3.78	3.73	3.86	0.05
Nationalism	4.46	4.42	4.46	4.38	4.42	0.25
Social Media	3.76	3.73	3.75	3.69	3.67	0.31
Foreign Links	0.84	0.85	0.77	0.81	0.82	0.33
N	798	804	804	801	801	

Note: For each pretreatment variable, the table presents the mean value by treatment condition. In addition, for each pretreatment variable, the last column presents the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality in means across treatment conditions. Age Group is measured on a five-point scale.

Table A3: **Balance Checks (Study 2)**

	Control Group	Invasion	Economic Measures	Military Measures	<i>F</i> -test p-value
Age Group	4.18	4.18	4.20	4.07	0.32
Female	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.79
Education	3.20	3.23	3.21	3.14	0.09
Income	3.60	3.55	3.57	3.50	0.23
Party Member	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.35
Political Interests	3.52	3.50	3.51	3.51	0.97
Ideology	3.65	3.72	3.73	3.65	0.17
Nationalism	4.02	4.05	4.06	4.05	0.81
Social Media Usage	3.59	3.61	3.60	3.61	0.97
Foreign Links	0.82	0.86	0.82	0.86	0.55
<i>N</i>	782	779	813	819	

Note: For each pretreatment variable, the table presents the mean value by treatment condition. In addition, for each pretreatment variable, the last column presents the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality in means across treatment conditions. Age Group is measured on an eight-point scale.

B Hypotheses Testing

B.1 Main Hypotheses

- **Hypothesis 1:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western economic measures against Russia will express **lower** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only (**H2a**), and compared with no information about Russian invasion (**H2b**).
 - **Hypothesis 2':** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western economic measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only (**H2'a**), and compared with no information about Russian invasion (**H2'b**).
- **Hypothesis 3:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western military measures against Russia will express **lower** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only (**H3a**), and compared with no information about Russian invasion (**H3b**).
 - **Hypothesis 3':** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western military measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only (**H3'a**), and compared with no information about Russian invasion (**H3'b**).
- **Hypothesis 4:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and lack of Western military measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only (**H4a**), and compared with no information about Russian invasion (**H4b**).

Figure 1 in the main text presents the results for hypothesis: H1, H2b, H3b, H4b. Figure 3 in the main text presents the results for hypothesis: H2a, H3a, H4a.

- According to Figure 1, the results strongly support H1. Respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine express significantly higher support for the use of military force in general and against Taiwan in particular.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results provide some support for H2'b and H2a. Information about Western measures seems to partially offset the effect of the Russian invasion, but its deterrence effects are weak. Respondents are still more likely to support invading Taiwan than the control group.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results strongly support H3a. Respondents exposed to information about Western military measures express significantly lower support for the use of military force in general and against Taiwan in particular, compared with those who are only exposed to information about the Russian invasion. The effect of Western military measures seems to completely offset the effect of the Russian invasion.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results provide some support for H4b but go against H4a. Information about the lack of Western military measures seems to increase support for the use of force in general. However, instead of further increasing support compared with information about the Russian invasion only, it reduces support for invading Taiwan. Perhaps, the information still primes the respondents about the potential military capability of the Western countries.

B.2 Robustness Checks

Figures B1 and B2 repeat the analyses in Figures 1 and 3, but control for pretreatment covariates. Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means (Average Treatment Effect) between each treatment condition and the control group. Pretreatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.

Figure B3 displays our complete set of findings for various potential strategies concerning the unification of Taiwan. These include unification via war, military coercion, economic sanctions, and maintaining the status quo. Additionally, we present the treatment effects to examine the support for Taiwan’s independence.

Figure B1: **The Effect of Each Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan (right), Controlling for Pretreatment Covariates.** Note: Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent higher support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means (Average Treatment Effect) between each treatment condition and the control group. Pre-treatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.




Figure B2: **The Effect of Each Treatment Condition vis-à-vis the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan (right), controlling for Pretreatment Covariates.** Note: Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference in means between each treatment condition and the invasion group. Pre-treatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.





Figure B3: **The Effect of Each Treatment Condition on Different Approaches for Taiwan's Unification.** Note: All outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent higher support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means between each treatment condition and the control group.



B.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects & Weighted Sample

Figure B4 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the invasion treatment in Study 1. As the figure shows, there are no marked differences in the effect of the invasion treatment across subsets determined by pre-treatment covariates.

Figure B4: The Heterogeneous Treatment Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Against Taiwan (right) in Study 1.





Figure B5 displays the heterogeneous treatment effects observed in Study 2. The results highlight notable variations in treatment effects among respondents categorized as having low nationalism and high nationalism. This finding suggests that one year and four months into the Russian invasion, distinct groups of Chinese citizens began to form diverse interpretations of the conflict. It is conceivable that individuals with stronger nationalist sentiments were more inclined to align with the Russian narrative and exhibit a more hawkish stance. Conversely, those with lower levels of nationalism may have been more inclined to adopt the Western perspective, resulting in diminished support for military intervention. Because the vast majority (76.8%) are high in nationalism, the overall treatment effects are still positive.

Figure B5: The Heterogeneous Treatment Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Against Taiwan (right) in Study 2.



Tables B1 and B2 present the OLS regression results using the weighted samples. Like many other online surveys in China, the sample in both surveys may not be representative (Huang, 2018; Pan and Xu, 2020). To address this concern, and as described in the pre-analysis plan, we weigh the survey sample such that they resemble the Chinese Internet population. As indicated in Tables B1 and B2, the principal results remain the same using the weighted models.

However, the findings from Study 2 (Columns 3 & 4 of Table B2) reveal an interesting contrast between the unweighted and weighted models. Unlike the unweighted models, the respondents in the Military Measures group demonstrate a significant increase in their likelihood to support the use of force against Taiwan when the weighted model is employed. This discrepancy raises doubts regarding the effectiveness of Western military measures in countering the heightened aggression stimulated by the Russian invasion.

Table B1: Treatment Effects on Support for the Use of Force and Invading Taiwan, Weighted Sample, with and without Pre-Treatment Covariates (Study 1)

<i>Outcome Variables</i>	Support for the Use of Force		Use of Force Against Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Treatment Groups</i>				
Invasion	0.171*** (0.054)	0.119** (0.052)	0.200*** (0.054)	0.171*** (0.054)
Economic Measures	0.036 (0.054)	-0.002 (0.052)	0.112** (0.055)	0.101* (0.054)
Military Measures	-0.063 (0.053)	-0.056 (0.051)	0.022 (0.054)	0.047 (0.053)
Lack of Military Measures	0.076 (0.053)	0.056 (0.052)	0.033 (0.054)	0.024 (0.053)
<i>Pre-Treatment Covariates</i>				
Female		-0.062* (0.034)		-0.141*** (0.034)
Age Group		0.140*** (0.014)		0.124*** (0.015)
Education		0.038** (0.019)		0.024 (0.019)
Party Member		0.117** (0.048)		0.136*** (0.049)
Political Interest		0.053*** (0.015)		0.048*** (0.015)
Ideology		0.161*** (0.019)		0.179*** (0.019)
Nationalism		0.096*** (0.013)		0.061*** (0.013)
Social Media Usage		-0.044*** (0.017)		-0.035** (0.017)
Foreign Link		-0.098*** (0.020)		-0.090*** (0.021)
Constant	3.298*** (0.038)	2.096*** (0.122)	3.265*** (0.038)	2.156*** (0.125)
Weighted	×	×	×	×
N	3,955	3,746	3,989	3,778
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.108	0.004	0.087

Notes: Dependent variables are indicated in column headings and are measured on a five-point scale. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table B2: Treatment Effects on Support for the Use of Force and Invading Taiwan, Weighted Sample, with and without Pre-Treatment Covariates (Study 2)

<i>Outcome Variables</i>	Support for the Use of Force		Use of Force Against Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Treatment Groups</i>				
Invasion	0.076* (0.046)	0.062 (0.044)	0.192*** (0.047)	0.177*** (0.046)
Economic Measures	0.001 (0.045)	0.015 (0.043)	0.139*** (0.046)	0.144*** (0.045)
Military Measures	0.029 (0.045)	0.010 (0.043)	0.091** (0.046)	0.087* (0.045)
<i>Pre-Treatment Covariates</i>				
Female		-0.115*** (0.031)		-0.038 (0.033)
Age Group		0.011 (0.009)		0.005 (0.010)
Education		0.017 (0.021)		0.062*** (0.022)
Party Member		0.003 (0.049)		-0.076 (0.051)
Political Interest		0.064*** (0.016)		0.007 (0.017)
Ideology		0.264*** (0.017)		0.251*** (0.018)
Nationalism		0.134*** (0.018)		0.127*** (0.019)
Social Media Usage		-0.026 (0.017)		-0.036** (0.017)
Foreign Link		-0.040** (0.019)		-0.002 (0.019)
Constant	3.573*** (0.032)	1.921*** (0.132)	3.553*** (0.033)	2.033*** (0.139)
Weighted	×	×	×	×
N	3,190	3,074	3,190	3,074
Adjusted R ²	0.0002	0.128	0.005	0.100

Notes: Dependent variables are indicated in column headings and are measured on a five-point scale. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

B.4 Mechanism Hypotheses

The figures in this section report the results of causal mediation analysis (with multiple mediators). We adopt the framework of VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2014) and Yu, Fan and Wu (2014) which allows for the presence of multiple mediators per treatment condition. As noted in the main text, the indirect effect of the invasion treatment through all the mediators accounts for almost 75% of the total effect of the invasion treatment on both outcomes. The remaining 25% is explained by the direct effect of the invasion treatment on both outcomes. A similar pattern is observed for all other treatment conditions.

Figure B6: **The Direct and Indirect Effect of Each Treatment Condition on the Support for the Use of Force.** Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (via all mediators) of each treatment condition on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).




Figure B7: **Mediation Analysis for Support for the Use of Force by Treatment Condition.** Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the indirect effects (by each mediator) and their corresponding 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).




Figure B8: **The Direct and Indirect Effect of Each Treatment Condition on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan.** Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (via all mediators) of each treatment condition on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).





Figure B9: **Mediation Analysis for Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan by Treatment Condition.** Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the indirect effects (by mediators) and their corresponding 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).




According to the figures, perceived morality, feasibility of peaceful resolutions, and perceived likelihood of success have significant causal mediation effects on the support for the use of force, when focusing on the Invasion and Lack of Military Measures treatments. In contrast, perceived economic costs, perceived military costs, and perceived threats have a null effect. The feasibility of peaceful resolutions seems to have the strongest indirect effect, implying that respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion might perceive

peaceful resolution of disputes less feasible, which subsequently leads to higher support for the use of force.

Finally, note that examining the role of each mediator at a time using the methods proposed by Imai et al. (2011), reveals similar patterns to our analysis examining the role of multiple mediators concurrently (see Figures B10 and B13).

Figure B10: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 1): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force.** Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



The Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force






Figure B11: Mediation Analysis (Experiment 2): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



The Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force

Figure B12: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 1): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan.** Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



The Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan





Figure B13: Mediation Analysis (Experiment 2): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



The Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan

C Treatment

C.1 Study 1

Invasion Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电 俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发动特别军事行动。

到目前为止 俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内激烈战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位达成一致。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

Economic Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电 俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发动特别军事行动。

到目前为止 俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内激烈战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位达成一致。

新华社华盛顿2月27日电 美国等国家26日发布联合声明 将部分俄罗斯银行排除在全球金融协会 SWIFT 支付系统之外 并对俄罗斯中央银行实施制裁措施。专家认为 这是“核选项”，金融制裁。这意味着俄罗斯银行将难以与境外进行交易 使俄对外贸易变得更加艰难。同时 对俄罗斯中央银行实施制裁措施将导致其相关产业“输入+输出”极大削弱宏观调控力。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

Xinhua News Agency, Washington, February 27. The United States and other Western countries issued a joint statement on the 26th, excluding some Russian banks from The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

(SWIFT) payment system, and imposing restrictions on the Russian central bank. Experts believe that this is a “nuclear-level” financial sanction. This means that Russian banks will not be able to conduct transactions with foreign banks, making Russian foreign trade more troublesome. At the same time, the restrictive measures against the Central Bank of Russia will cause its related assets to be “paralyzed,” greatly weakening the ability of macro-control.

Military Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电 俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发动特别军事行动。

到目前为止 俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内激烈战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位达成一致。

新华社布鲁塞尔2月28日电 北约秘书长斯托尔滕贝格2月28日说：北约正在向乌克兰提供数以万计的“爱国者”导弹、反坦克武器及其他援助。北约成员国已批准向乌克兰提供军事援助，包括标枪导弹和“爱国者”导弹等武器。他还说：北约正在向东欧地区、在北约成员国领土上增加兵力。乌克兰总统泽连斯基27日说 乌克兰正在为来自国外“志愿兵”组建“外国志愿军”。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine’s political status.

Xinhua News Agency, Brussels, February 28 NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said on the 28th that NATO is providing tens of thousands of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank weapons, and other assistance to Ukraine. NATO countries, such as the US, have approved sending military equipment to Ukraine, including key weapons such as Javelin missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. He also said that NATO is increasing the deployment of troops to the eastern region of the alliance and on the territory of NATO member states. Ukrainian President Zelensky said on the 27th that Ukraine is forming a “foreign volunteer army” for volunteers from abroad.

Lack of Military Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电 俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发动特别军事行动。

到前为 俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内战斗。双方政府仍未就如何束
军事冲突和乌克兰政地位成共。

当地时间2月24日 国总拜，一时在其演中斩截地：“我们
不会到乌克兰境内作战”。与同时 北书·斯托尔格也
同样不含地：“不会取任何接军事动支援乌克兰”。乌克兰
总斯基批·方已完全抛弃了乌克兰 乌克兰“孤军作战”。“
愿意与我们并战斗 我有 任何人。所有人害怕。”

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

February 24, local time, U.S. President Biden categorically stated that “our troops will never be sent to fight in Ukraine.” At the same time, NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg also unequivocally said that NATO “will not take any direct military action to support Ukraine.” Ukrainian President Zelensky criticizes the West for having completely abandoned Ukraine, saying that Ukraine is “fighting alone.” “Who wants to fight with us? I don't see anyone. Everyone is scared.”

Control (Lantern Festival)

新华>2月18日 星月当 万 人天上两元宵。岁岁年年 今又元
宵。元宵， 又“上元，”。在 人月两圆，时刻 州大地处处 放
无数家庭 愉。有，多人早已回到工作岗位 心怀梦想再出发 前，
e 充 力。

Xinhua News Agency, February 18th The star and moon are in the sky and ten thousand candles are burning. Year in and year out, this day is the Lantern Festival, also known as the "Shangyuan Festival". At this time when the moon is full, lanterns are displayed everywhere in the land of China, and countless families gather happily. Meanwhile, many people have already returned to work, set off with dreams in their hearts, and move forward with strength.

C.2 Study 2: Text

Invasion Treatment

新华 > 北京5月17日 5

俄乌冲突·局势 日一 列动态引人关注。 了战事 俄乌境内 标
' 受到对方打击。在乌克兰 当地时 16日凌晨 新华 > ° 在- 基...听到
密 声。乌方官员 俄 斯当天对基...实施了异常密 乌 2z
 在拦截 标。俄国 发言人 夫16日 当天凌晨 俄军使
 度 器对乌境内军事 施 中打击 包括乌 及 方援
 器和弹 储存地。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 17th.

A series of recent developments in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have garnered significant attention. In addition to the ongoing stalemate in the war, both Russia and Ukraine regularly experienced targeted attacks by the opposing side. In Ukraine, in the early hours of the 16th local time, reporters from Xinhua News Agency heard dense explosions in the capital Kyiv. Ukrainian officials said that Russia carried out an exceptionally intensive air strike on Kyiv that day, and the Ukrainian air defense system was intercepting the target.

[Insert Figure 1]

Economic Measures Treatment

新华 > 北京5月17日 5

俄乌冲突·局势 日一 列动态引人关注。 了战事 俄乌境内 标
' 受到对方打击。在乌克兰 当地时 16日凌晨 新华 > ° 在- 基...听到
密 声。乌方官员 俄 斯当天对基...实施了异常密 乌 2z
 在拦截 标。

普京总 去年2月下令军 入乌克兰以来 国为- , 方国家对俄 斯
发 极 制 图从 上击垮俄 斯。大 方公司撤出俄市场。 方国
家 对« 斯 , 出口实施了大 制 。最 是 俄 斯原 1 入
 且 俄 斯柴 1 入 导 俄 斯 1 收入同
 下 43%。俄 斯 国家 局2月20日公布, 初 数据显: 2022年
俄 斯国内 产总值 GDP 下 2.1%。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 17th.

A series of recent developments in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have

garnered significant attention. In addition to the ongoing stalemate in the war, both Russia and Ukraine regularly experienced targeted attacks by the opposing side. In Ukraine, in the early hours of the 16th local time, reporters from Xinhua News Agency heard dense explosions in the capital Kyiv. Ukrainian officials said that Russia carried out an exceptionally intensive air strike on Kyiv that day, and the Ukrainian air defense system was intercepting the target.

Since President Putin ordered troops into Ukraine in February last year, the United States and the West are imposing extreme sanctions on Russia, trying to destroy Russia economically. Many Western companies withdrew from the Russian market. Western countries have also imposed a raft of sanctions on Moscow's energy exports. The most important thing is to prohibit Russian crude oil from entering the EU by sea and to prohibit refined oil such as Russian diesel from entering the EU, resulting in a 43% year-on-year decline in Russian oil revenue. According to preliminary statistics released by the State Statistics Office of the Russian Federation on February 20, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 2.1% in 2022.

[Insert Figure 2]

Military Measures Treatment

新华 > 北京5月17日 5

俄乌冲突局势近日一系列动态引人关注。除了战事在俄乌境内持续外，双方都受到对方打击。在乌克兰，当地时间16日凌晨，新华社记者在基辅听到密集爆炸声。乌方官员称，俄罗斯当天对基辅实施了异常密集的无人机打击，在拦截目标。

据新华社4月报称，在盟国主导下，北约持续向乌克兰提供武器弹药，并提供人员培训与情报支持。自拜登政府上台以来，盟国承诺向乌克兰提供军事援助总额已达3430亿美元。近日，乌克兰总理波罗申科刚刚结束了对意大利、德国、法国和英国四国访问，并收到总额达27亿美元的军事援助，包括数十架无人机、数百枚导弹和数百架新型攻击型无人机。据报，波罗申科在乌克兰打了一个“北约战机”旨在培训乌克兰飞行员，首先使用北约战机。

Xinhua News Agency reporters Zhang Yuan, Liu Jian, Liu Yifang

It has been more than a year since Russia launched a special military operation against Ukraine. This year, the battlefield situation experienced many shocks and changes. Recently, both Russia and Ukraine are actively improving their military strength, and the war is still a stalemate.

As reported by Xinhua in April, under the leadership of the United States, NATO continues to deliver weapons and equipment to Ukraine, providing personnel training and intelligence support. Since the Biden administration came to power, the total amount of military aid pledged by the United States to Ukraine has reached 30 billion U.S. dollars. Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has just concluded his visit to Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and received a package of military aid totaling 2.7 billion euros, including dozens of armored vehicles, hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles, and several Hundreds of new long-range attack drones. According to reports, Zelensky said that Ukraine intends to create a "transnational fighter alliance" aimed at training Ukrainian pilots to fly advanced Western fighter jets.

[Insert Figure 3]

Control (Sericulture Festival)

新华 > 5月19日 5

上夏日桑葚大 ¥• 蚕业兴。5月13日 “和 í 传乐 8 ¥• ”2023, 四届 ¥• 蚕桑文化旅 8, 在 ¥• 县 í 传乡启幕。本届 ¥• 蚕桑文化旅 8, 以“和 í 传乐 8 ¥• ”为主 多 ô 度 ã û ¥• 蚕桑文化 ¾ ^ 内 µ 推出 û 列“¿ 上+¿ 下”文化体 Ɖ; 动 ú € 八方 8 客探寻大 Ž ¥• 、品味蚕桑文化、打卡 í 传故 ĩ 。

Xinhua News Agency, May 19th

Summer mulberries are beautiful on Moshang, and the silkworm industry is flourishing in Feixi. On May 13, the 4th Feixi Sericulture Culture and Tourism Festival kicked off in Mingchuan Township, Feixi County. The theme of this year's Feixi Sericulture Culture and Tourism Festival is "Traveling in Feixi in Harmony", interpreting the spiritual connotation of Feixi sericulture culture in multiple dimensions, launching a series of "online + offline" cultural experience activities, and sincerely invites tourists from all over the world to explore the beautiful Feixi, enjoying the sericulture culture in its hometown.

C.3 Study 2: Figures



Figure B14: Russian Invasion



Figure B15: Western Military Aid



Figure B16: Western Economic Measures



Figure B17: Cultural Festivals

D Measurement

D.1 Dependent Variables (Study 1)

- *Military Strength*: In general, China should rely more on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals.
总, 来ō 中国应ā 更多依` 军事力ī 来实° 外交ī 标。
- *Taiwan*: If peaceful reunification cannot be achieved within three years, then Taiwan should be reunified by force.
如果在三年内无ō实° 和平β一 应ā f 力β一台~ 。

D.2 Dependent Variables (Study 2)

- *Military Strength*: In general, China should rely more on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals.
总, 来ō 中国应ā 更多依` 军事力ī 来实° 外交ī 标。
- *Taiwan 1*: China should rely more on its military strength to reunify Taiwan
中国应ā 更多依` 军事力ī 来实° β一台~ 。
- *Taiwan 2*: Which of the following potential policies toward Taiwan do you find acceptable or unacceptable in the next five years, or are you unsure?

[The order of the following policies is randomized]

在未来, 五年ī 以下可ý, 大F 对台政V中 哪些是您可以接受, 哪些不ý

- Launching the unification war to take back Taiwan entirely.
一鼓作 彻底f 力收复台~
- Initiating limited military campaigns on the outskirts of Taiwan and taking back its offshore islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, coercing Taiwanese authorities to accept unification.
实施台~ 外围战役 如收复Ñè、妈V < è 台~ 当局接受β一
- Imposing economic sanctions, and even cutting off economic and personnel exchanges, to facilitate unification.
对台~ 实施ī N制Á ó断Ý和台~, ī 8、人员往来 (ī N手 μ促Ūβ一
- Maintaining the status quo and continuing to increase economic and military power so that Taiwan would eventually seek unification with

the mainland.

坚持“一国两制”发展两岸军事实力 台湾不会主动寻求统一

- Keeping their separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game.

两岸可以各为其主 不一定非要统一

D.3 Mechanism Variables

- *Perceived Economic Costs:* Involving in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will have severe negative impacts on China's economic development.

在近期中国参与任何大规模军事冲突都会对中国未来经济发展带来严重影响和负面影响。

- *Perceived Military Costs:* Involving in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will result in severe casualties and significantly increase military spending.

在近期中国参与任何大规模军事冲突都会导致严重人员伤亡和巨额军费开支负担。

- *Perceived Likelihood of Success:* As long as the People's Liberation Army takes military action, it will surely achieve its military goals, maintaining territorial integrity and realizing the reunification of the motherland.

只要解放军采取行动就一定能够实现军事目标 维护领土完整和实现国家统一。

- *Perceived Threat:* Maintaining the status quo on territorial sovereignty disputes such as Taiwan, Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border, will create great threats to China's national security in the long run.

对于类似台湾、钓鱼岛、南海和中印边境领土主权争议等问题 长期保持现状将对中国国家安全和利益构成重大威胁。

- *Perceived Morality:* A military operation on the ground of territorial unity and integrity is completely moral, even though it may cause many civilian casualties.

即使会造成许多平民伤亡 以维护国家统一和领土完整为名 名义上对外发动军事行动也是完全道德的。

- *Perceived US Influence:* In recent years, the US's power and influence in

international affairs have been declining.

多年来 中国在国际事务中，影响力在降低。

- *Alternative Peaceful Resolutions*: It is impossible to resolve territorial sovereignty disputes such as Taiwan, Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border by peaceful means.

{ 似台、岛、南海和中印领土主权争议是不可调和的，方式解决。

D.4 Additional Mechanism Variables in Study 2

- *Perceived Legality*: A preemptive military operation, even on the ground of territorial unity and integrity, will be an act of aggression that violates international law.

即使是以领土完整和统一的名义先发制人，军事行动也将是一反国际法，侵犯。

- *Peaceful Image*: Being involved in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will harm China's image as a peace-loving nation.

在未来任何大规模军事冲突中，都会损害中国爱好和平的形象。

- *Perceived Threat 2*: The United States and other Western countries are the major threats to China's peace and prosperity.

中国和其他西方国家是中国和平与繁荣的主要威胁。

D.5 Control Variables

As described above, we include two different sets of pre-treatment covariates: demographic covariates and predisposition covariates. Demographic covariates include *education*, *age*, *gender*, and *region*. These demographic covariates are widely used in experiments across different contexts. Predisposition covariates include *party membership*, *nationalism*, *political interests*, *ideology*, *social media usage*, *foreign connection*.

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